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Abstract 
Inequality in Mexico rose between 1989 and 1994 and declined between 
1994 and 2010. We examine the role of market forces (demand and supply 
of labour by skill), institutional factors (minimum wages and unionization 
rate), and public policy (cash transfers) in explaining changes in inequality. 
We apply the ‘re-centered influence function’ method to decompose changes 
in hourly wages into characteristics and returns. The main driver is changes 
in returns.  Returns rose (1989-1994) due to institutional factors and labor 
demand. Returns declined (1994-2006) due to changes in supply and --to a 
lesser  extent--in  demand;  institutional  factors  were  not 
relevant.  Government  transfers  contributed  to  the  decline  in  inequality, 
especially after 2000.  
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1  Introduction 
During the last twenty years, the evolution of inequality in Mexico followed two distinct 
patterns (Figure 1): it rose between 1989 and the mid-1990s and declined between the 
mid-1990s and 2010. All in all, the Gini coefficient for per capita (disposable monetary) 
income rose from 0.548 to 0.571 between 1989 and 1994, and declined to 0.510 in 
2010.
1 The period of declining inequality can also be divided in two: 1994 -2006, when 
inequality decidedly fell (Gini fell from 0.571 to 0.512); and, 2006-10, when the decline 
in inequality loses its steam
.2  
Esquivel, Lustig and Scott (2010) show that changes in labour income and non-labour 
income inequality were equalizing for the period 1996-2006 and that the decline in 
labour income inequality was by far the most important proximate determinant of the 
observed  decline  in  overall  inequality.
3  Given  the  importance  of  labour  market 
inequality dynamics in explaining the trend in overall inequality, this paper concentrates 
on  analysing  the more  ‘fundamental’  determinants  of  labour  income  inequality.  In 
particular, it examines the role of market forces (relative demand and supply of labour 
by skill) and institutional factors (minimum wages and unionization rate) in explaining 
changes in the distribution of hourly wages. It also extends the analysis to 2010. By 
doing  so,  it  examines  the  factors  that  may  account  for  the  pause  (reversal?)  in  the 
decline in inequality momentum between 2006 and 2010. 
More specifically, this paper applies the (‘re-centred influence function’ or RIF) method 
proposed by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) to decompose changes in hourly wages 
into characteristics and returns effects
.4 Results reveal that the main driver behind the 
rise and decline in earnings inequality are changes in returns
.5 Given the prominence of 
the returns effect, the paper proceeds to analyse the determinants of the evolution of 
relative returns in turn. 
Changes in returns can be due to changes in the relative demand and supply of workers 
of different characteristics (in particular, education used as a proxy for skill) and/or 
changes in institutional factors such as the minimum wage and the unionization rate. We 
apply the methodology proposed by Bound and Johnson (1992) to shed light on which 
factors were predominant. The results suggest that institutional factors and the increase 
                                                 
1   As  is  the  case  with  practically  all  inequality  estimates  based  on  household  surveys,  the  Gini 
coefficients presented here are probably an underestimation of ‘true’ levels of inequality because of 
the significant under-reporting of incomes and consumption at the top of the distribution. 
2   The years 1996 and 2008 are atypical because the country was experiencing a crisis. In this paper we 
do not attempt to explain which factors determine inequality dynamics when there was a crisis. 
3  The  reduction  in  labour  income  inequality  (leaving  out  the  interaction  terms)  accounted  for  87.1 
percent of the decline in inequality in 1996-2000 and for 65.5 percent of the decline in 2000-06. 
4  Although the RIF procedure was published in 2009, there have been several papers employing it. See 
Chi, Li and Yu (2011) for an application of wage inequality in China; Thu Le and Booth (2010) for a 
decomposition in Vietnam; and Holmes and Mayhew (2010) for a labour market analysis in the UK. 
5  In fact, changes in characteristics were unequalizing during the period of declining inequality (1994-
2006) in spite of the reduction in the Gini coefficient for education. This suggests a persistence of 
what  Bourguignon,  Ferreira  and  Lustig  (2005)  called  the  ‘paradox  of  progress’  which  Legovini, 
Bouillon and Lustig (2005) found in Mexico for the period 1984-94.   3 
in relative demand for skilled workers (workers with high school education and more) 
explained the increase in hourly wages (earnings) inequality between 1989 and 1994. 
This result is consistent with the findings of a large body of existing research (see, for 
example,  Revenga  1997;  Hanson  and  Harrison  1999;  Bosch  and  Manacorda  2010). 
Institutional  factors,  however,  did  not  account  for  the  decline  in  wage  inequality 
between 1994 and 2006. The evidence suggests that wage inequality fell because the 
supply of skilled workers outpaced demand. The slightly rising trend in wage inequality 
during 2006 and 2010 appears to be the consequence of a weakening in the relative 
demand of low-skilled workers (workers with secondary education or less). 
Figure 1  
Mexico: Evolution of the Gini Coefficient, 1989-2010 
 
Notes:  
a)  Total disposable income includes labour and non-labour monetary income (net of direct taxes and 
contributions to social security), transfers (private and public), and non-monetary income (imputed 
rent for owner’s occupied housing, gifts in kind and own-consumption).  
b)  Disposable monetary income excludes non-monetary income.  
c)  Hourly wage is equal to monthly labour income over weekly hours of work times 4.33. Hourly 
wage inequality is calculated for individuals 18-65 yrs old with positive income and it includes 
labour income from wages and self-employment.  
d)  Following standard practice, households whose head reported zero labour incomes are excluded. 
Results, however, are similar if we include all households. The latter are shown in the Statistical 
Appendix.  
e)  Differences between Gini coefficients are statistically significant for the pairs: 1994-2006; 
1994-2010; but not for 1989-1994 and 2006-2010.  
f)  There  is  Lorenz  dominance  between  1994-2006  and  1994-2010;  and  no  Lorenz  dominance 
between 1989-1994 and 2006-2010. 
g)  Results are similar if we use other inequality measures such as the Theil index. See Statistical 
Appendix. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENIGH, several years. 
 
As mentioned above, another factor behind the decline in overall inequality was the 
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Labor income Hourly Wage  4 
income is a very heterogeneous category. It includes all forms of income from capital 
(although  grossly  under-reported  in  household  surveys),  pensions  from  contributory 
systems,  private  transfers  (remittances,  in  particular)  and  government  transfers.  An 
application  of  the  Lerman  and  Yitzhaki  (1985)  decomposition  to  the  Mexican  data 
showed  that  income  from  capital  is  always  unequalizing  while  incomes  from 
remittances  and  government  transfers  are  always  equalizing.  The  importance  of 
government transfers as an equalizing factor has risen considerable over time. The fiscal 
incidence  analysis  by  López-Calva,  Lustig  and  Scott  (2012)  also  underscores  the 
growing importance of government transfers to reduce inequality and poverty. 
In this paper we use the Gini coefficient as our preferred measure of inequality.
6 This 
measure  satisfies  all  the  desirable  properties  of  an  inequality  indicator,
7  and  is 
decomposable  by  proximate  determinants  as  well  as  income  sources.
8  We  use 
disposable monetary income per capita unless specified otherwise.
9 All of our estimates 
use information from the National Survey of Household Incomes and Expenditures 
(ENIGH, for its acronym in Spanish) for 1989, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2006, 2008 and 
2010.
10 The surveys capture income net of taxes and contributions to social security and 
include government and private transfers (remittances). 
2  Proximate determinants of overall inequality 
Figure  1  shows  the  evolution  of  income  inequality  for  several  income  measures. 
Measures of inequality at the household level include total disposable income (labour 
and non-labour income, transfers both public and private, and non-monetary income 
like  imputed  rent  and  autoconsumption),  monetary  disposable  income  (total  income 
minus non-monetary income), and labour income. The graph also includes hourly wage 
inequality at the individual level.
11 All measures show the same pattern: a rise in income 
                                                 
6  Other measures of inequality such as the Theil index show similar trends as those described in the 
text. See the Statistical Appendix. 
7  These  principles  are:  (i)  adherence  to  the  Pigou-Dalton  transfer  principle,  (ii)  symmetry,  
(iii) independence of scale, (iv) homogeneity, and (v) decomposability.  
8   Although it is not additively decomposable as the Theil index. 
9  Income includes labour income and non-labour income. The former includes all the income that is 
reported as labour income in ENIGH, including labour income from the self-employed. Non-labour 
income includes incomes from own businesses, incomes from assets (including capital gains) pensions 
(public and private) and public transfers (Oportunidades and Procampo) and private transfers (e.g., 
remittances) as well as––when indicated––Non-monetary income (imputed rent on owner occupied 
housing and consumption of own production, common in poor rural areas). Official poverty measures 
in  Mexico  use  net  current  income;  that  is,  capital  gains  and  gifts  and  in-kind  transfers  to  other 
households are subtracted from current total income. Current monetary income, the concept used in 
the decomposition of inequality by source presented here, does not include non-monetary income and 
consumption of own production (common in poor rural areas) and excludes capital gains.  
10 In Spanish, Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH). Although the 1989 
survey  is  less  comparable,  we  present  results  related  to  the  factors  behind  the  rise  in  inequality 
between 1989-94. 
11 Hourly wages include hourly earnings for salaried workers and the self-employed. All calculations use 
sampling weights in order to generalize the results to the full population. As commonly employed in 
the  literature  of  labour  economics  (see,  for  example,  Autor,  Katz  and  Kearney  2008;  Card  and   5 
inequality between 1989 and the mid-1990s and a decline in inequality between the 
mid-1990s and the mid-2000s. Between the mid-2000s and 2010, however, the pattern 
is less clear. For instance, overall (wage) inequality rose (fell) in 2008 and declined 
(rose) in 2010.  
A useful starting point in the analysis of the determinants of inequality is to decompose 
the Gini coefficient into its main components and examine their contribution. Here we 
disaggregate total (monetary) income into labour income, income from capital
12 (profits, 
interests, rents, etc.), private transfers (primarily remittances) and government transfers. 
Using  the  Lerman  and  Yitzhaki  (1985)  method  we  can  distinguish  between  the 
inequality  increasing  and  inequality  decreasing  components. 13  The  marginal 
contribution to total inequality of each component k is shown to depend on its own Gini 
coefficient (   , the size of its share in total income (    and the correlation between 
the component and total income (   . Furthermore, one can show that the  per cent 




     
 
  
      
 
     
   
Figure 2 shows the results of applying the decomposition to 1994, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 
2010. The contribution of income from ‘capital’ (own business, income from property, 
financial  income  and  contributory  pensions),  as  expected,  is  always  inequality 
increasing  whereas  remittances  and  government  transfers  are  always  inequality 
reducing. Contribution of government transfers is higher than that of remittances and it 
has grown significantly over time. Income from capital represents, roughly, 20 per cent 
of total income; income from remittances and government transfers, the remaining 20 
per cent.  
Labour income, which represents more than 60 per cent of total income, does not show 
a definite pattern. It was inequality increasing in 1994 and very much so in 2010 but it 
was inequality reducing in 2000, 2006 and 2004.
15 Between 1994 and 2006, the Gini 
coefficient of labour income fell, while the two other components (the share of labour 
income in total income and the correlation of labour and total income) remained 
basically constant. Between 2006 and 2010 there is practically no change in the Gini but 
the other two components increased.  The latter appears to account for the fact that 
labour income became unequalizing in 2010. 
                                                                                                                                               
DiNardo 2002), calculations of hourly wage inequality employ as weight the product of the sampling 
weight times weekly hours of work. 
12 This source of income is subject to severe underreporting as incomes derived from capital at the top 
are not really captured in the household surveys (in Mexico and everywhere else). Here pensions from 
contributory systems are included under income derived from capital. Pensions are treated as income 
from savings, so to speak. There are a number of reasons for not including them  in  government 
transfers but this is not the place to discuss them. For more, see Lustig (2011a). 
13 See also Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986). 
14 For more details see appendix. 
15  These results are slightly different from those presented in Esquivel (2011) and Esquivel, Lustig and 
Scott (2010), due to revisions in the data and in the definitions of income.   6 
Figure 2 
Mexico: Decomposition of overall inequality, 1994, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2010 
 
Note:   Income is total current household monetary disposable (after direct taxes, 
contributions to social security and cash transfers) income in per capita terms. 
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on ENIGH, several years. 
 
Given the prominent  role played by  labour  income inequality in  accounting for the 
evolution  of  overall  inequality,  below  we  focus  on  analysing  the  determinants  of 
earnings inequality. In particular, we analyse the determinants of inequality in hourly 
wages (where ‘hourly wages’ means the hourly remuneration of both employees and the 
self-employed) since labour income inequality also reflects decisions to participate in 
the labour market not examined here.  
3  Determinants of earnings inequality: the contribution of characteristics 
and returns  
As observed in Figure 1, wage inequality (measured by the Gini for hourly wages) rose 
between 1989 and 1994. After 1994 there is a clear decline. This process stops in 2006: 
since then, wage inequality has risen slightly in 2010.
16 In this section, we analyse the 
                                                 
16  It is important to corroborate the results for other inequality indexes. We calculated the results for the 
Gini  index,  Theil  coefficient,  Standard  deviation  of  logs,  and  the  difference  in  logs  of  the  90th 
percentile and 10th percentile. For the period 1989-94 there is an increase in inequality for all indexes 
and measures of income. There is a decline of inequality for all indexes for the period 1994-2006. For 
the period 2006-10 and monthly labour income, the Gini and the Theil coefficients show no change in 
inequality,  and  the  standard  deviation  and  the  difference  in  percentile  show  a  slight  increase  in 
inequality. In the case of hourly wage, there is a clear decline in inequality for the period 1994-2006 
for all indexes and then a slight increase for the period 2006-10. In sum, these results point out a 
downward trend in labour income inequality, at least up to 2006. Since then, inequality has remained 
relatively stable with a small increase in inequality by 2010, depending how we measure inequality. 
We also did the calculations using the Labour Force Survey for the period 2005-10 (ENOE) and the 
results are robust across both surveys.   7 
main determinants of the observed trends in wage inequality. We do this by applying 
the decomposition methodology proposed by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009). 
Wage inequality is affected by two main factors: the distribution of (observable and 
unobservable)  characteristics  of  workers  (e.g.,  education,  experience,  gender,  talent, 
etc.)  and  the  returns  to  those  characteristics.  Workers’  characteristics,  in  turn,  are 
affected by ‘fate’ (e.g., gender, race, talent, and so on) households’ decisions (e.g., to 
enrol in school) and policy (e.g., expanding access to education). Returns to households’ 
characteristics depend on market forces (i.e., demand and supply of workers of different 
skills and experience) and institutional/policy factors (e.g., minimum wage policy and 
the unionization rate).  
Figure 3  
Mexico: Relative returns and relative supply, 1989-2010 
Relative returns  Relative supply 
   
Notes:   Sample restricted to workers 18-65 years old. Panel A plots relative returns of education groups 
with respect to primary or less. Panel B plots relative supply (in logs) of education groups with 
respect to primary or less. Primary or less refers to individuals with less than secondary (9 years 
of schooling), secondary refers to individuals with equal to or more than 9 and less than 12 years 
of schooling, high school refers to individuals with equal to or more than 12 and less than 16 
years of schooling, and college refers to individuals with at least 16 years of schooling. Relative 
returns are obtained from a regression of log hourly wages against dummies of education groups 
(excluding primary or less), and controlling for gender and rural dummies, age and age squared, 
and  5  geographic  dummies  (Mexico  City,  Guadalajara,  Monterrey,  border  states,  southern 
states: Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, Yucatán and Quintana Roo). Results are in the Statistical 
Appendix. Relative supply is equal to the log of the ratio of proportion of workers in a specific 
group over the proportion of workers with primary or less. Panel B includes the relative supply (in 
logs) of education groups with respect to primary or less. The figure shows that the relative 
supply  of  the  three  categories  increased  relative  to  unskilled  workers  with  college-educated 
workers increasing the most, especially since 1998.  
Source:  Calculations by the authors using ENIGH.  
As  one  can  observe  in  Figure  3,  both  workers’  returns  and  characteristics  (i.e., 
education) changed during 1989 and 2010
.17 The evolution of returns (panel A) follows 
an inverted-U at least up until 2006. Since 2006, returns to college-educated workers 
begin to rise. Panel B shows that the proportion of workers with secondary, high school 
and college degrees (incomplete primary and no education) rose (declined) steadily and 
                                                 
17  Panel A presents the relative returns and Panel B the relative supply. Relative returns (with respect to 
primary or less) are obtained from a regression of log hourly wages against dummies of education 
groups  (secondary,  high  school  and  college)  and  control  variables  such  as  age  and  geographic 
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Year
Secondary High School
College  8 
the relative supply of college graduates rose faster since 1998. Measured by the Gini, 
inequality in the distribution of years of schooling for Mexican workers (ages between 
25 and 65) declined from 0.444 in 1989 to 0.324 in 2008.
18  
We now proceed to quantify the contribution of changes in characteristics and changes 
in returns to the observed changes in wage inequality. In particular, we decompose the 
change in log hourly wages into characteristics (also called quantity, composition or 
population) effects and returns (also called price) effects. Given the trends observed in 
Figure 3, we would expect for the contribution of returns to be unequalizing between 
1989 and 1994 and equalizing between 1994 and 2006. In contrast, the effect of changes 
in the composition of characteristics cannot be inferred ex ante.  
Although there was significant educational upgrading and the distribution of the stock 
of education became more equal over the entire period under study, whether this change 
was equalizing or unequalizing depends on the extent of convexity in the returns to 
education and at what point of the education equalization process the country found 
itself. Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig (2005) were among the first to notice that a 
reduction  in  the  inequality  of  education––in  the  presence  of  increasing  returns  to 
education––could lead to a rise in earnings inequality. They call this result the ‘paradox 
of progress’ alluding to the fact that a more equal stock of education can be inequality-
increasing (at least during part of the educational upgrading process) if the returns to 
education increase at an increasing rate with the level of attainment (convexity in the 
returns). As Gasparini et al. (2011), the ‘paradox of progress’ has been quite a pervasive 
phenomenon in Latin American labour markets in the last couple of decades. 
3.1  Decomposing wage inequality into characteristics and returns effects: 
an application of the re-centred influence function (RIF) procedure 
(1989-2010) 
There are many decomposition procedures that are employed in the literature (see the 
excellent review by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux 2011). Most of them rely on a Oaxaca-
Blinder  (OB)  type  of  decomposition.
19  In  this  paper,  we  employ  the  ‘re-centred 
influence function’ (RIF) procedure proposed by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) to 
decompose effects into characteristics or composition and returns effects.
20  
The  RIF  procedure  is  very  similar to  the typical  OB  decomposition.
21  The  main 
difference is that the dependent variable,  Y, is replaced by the ‘re-centred influence 
                                                 
18  See  Socio-Economic  Database  for  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  (SEDLAC),  available  at: 
wwwsedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/statistics-detalle.php?idE=37. 
19 We can divide the decomposition into four groups: (i) Reweighting procedures (DiNardo, Fortin and 
Lemieux 1996), (ii) Residual-imputation procedures (Almeida dos Reis and Paes de Barros 1991; 
Juhn, Murphy and Pierce 1993), (iii) Quantile decomposition procedures (Machado and Mata 2005), 
and (iv) Re-centred Influence Function (RIF) procedures (Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux 2009). 
20  Although the RIF procedure was published in 2009, there have been several papers employing it. See 
Chi, Li and Yu (2011) for an application of wage inequality in China; Thu Le and Booth (2010) for a 
decomposition in Vietnam; and Holmes and Mayhew (2010) for a labour market analysis in the UK. 
21  See the papers by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009, 2011) for more details of the RIF procedure.   9 
function’ (RIF).
22 Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) demonstrate that the RIF procedure 
is  equivalent  to  a  si mple  unconditional  quantile  regression.  They  show  that 
                   , where the coefficient    represents the marginal effect of X on 
the dependent variable statistic v.
23 
Once we estimate the parameter     for each year in our sample, we apply a Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition.
24 In other words, we estimate                            
                
        
 
        
   where t is the final year and s is the initial year. In our application, we set 
up the initial years as 1989, 1994, and 2006 and the final years as 1994, 2006 and 2010 
respectively. As typical in  a OB decomposition,  the term      
               refers to  the 
characteristics effects and the term         
 
        
   refers to the return or price effects to 
observable characteristics included in X and also, unobservable ones (which is why this 
term is often referred to as the ‘unexplained component’). We use as reference the wage 
distribution in the initial year (for each decomposition).  
Figure 4 shows the decomposition for quantiles 1, 2, …, 99. In other words, we estimate 
the RIF procedure in every quantile and obtain the difference in the average wage for 
each quantile and then the part attributed to characteristics and to returns. The figure 
includes  three  panels  for  different  periods.  Panel  A  1989-94  shows  that  inequality 
increased during the period. In this period, observable characteristics explained little of 
the increase in inequality, given that the part explained by characteristics is a flat line. 
The increase in inequality was mostly due to returns as shown by the upward sloping 
shape of the ‘effects of returns’ curve.  
Panel B (1994-2006), on the other hand, shows that inequality decreased during the 
period.  Wages  for  low-earning  individuals  rose  while  those  for  richer  individuals 
declined. Interestingly, the effects of characteristics (education, experience, female and 
urban) were inequality increasing. In other words, if returns to characteristics had been 
equal to their 1994 level, the change in characteristics in the population (in spite of the 
equalization of education) would have increased inequality. This points to a persistence 
of the ‘paradox of progress’ found for Mexico (1984-94) by Legovini, Bouillon and 
Lustig (2005). Hence, the driving force behind the decline in wage inequality between 
1994 and 2006 must have been the effects of returns. As shown in Panel B, the effects 
of returns contributed to equalize the earnings distribution by such an amount that they 
                                                 
22  Define RIF(v,y) as the re-centred influence function with distributional statistic of interest v(Fy) and 
observed wage y. Then it can be shown that RIF(v,y)= v(Fy)+IF(v,y), where IF denotes the influence 
function  such  that               .  For  the  case  of  quantiles,  it  can  be  shown  that  the  influence 
function  is  equal  to        
         
       .  Each  statistic  v(Fy)  refers  to  a  specific  quantile  in  the 
distribution of Y or to the Gini coefficient or the variance. 
23  For example, if v represents quantile 0.50, then        represents the effect of X on the wage quantile 
0.50. It can also be applied to scalar indicators of inequality such as the Gini or the variance. In order 
to estimate the RIF regression, we first estimate the sample            . In practice, we follow the ado 
file  rifreg  in  Stata  published  by  Firpo,  Fortin  and  Lemieux  (2011)  provided  by  N.  Fortin 
(www.faculty.arts.ubc.ca/nfortin/datahead.html).  The  RIF  dependent  variable  is  estimated  using 
kernel  methods.  We  use  the  following  explanatory  variables:  dummy  variables  of  female,  urban, 
education categories and a cubic polynomial in age. We also estimated a more flexible model that 
included  interactions  among  all  variables,  however  the  difference  in  explained  and  unexplained 
components was minimal. 
24  We follow the ado file oaxaca in Stata implemented by Jann (2008).   10 
compensated  the  inequality-increasing  effects  associated  with  the  changes  in 
characteristics.
25  Although  we  do  not  disaggregate  the  returns  into  its  various 
components, this  result is consistent with the fall in the relative returns to education 
shown in Figure 3.  
Figure 4  
Mexico: Decomposition of differences in the distribution of earnings: 1989-2010 
A: 1989-94  B: 1994-2006 
   
C: 2006-10 
 
Notes:   Total  differential is the  total change in  hourly  wages  (in  logs);  Effects  of  Characteristics  and 
Effects of Returns are the portions that one can ascribe to changes in characteristics (years of 
schooling and experience) and returns (to those characteristics), respectively. 
  The reference distribution in each panel is the initial year. The results are obtained using the 
ado-file  rifreg  provided  by  Fortin  (www.faculty.arts.ubc.ca/nfortin/datahead.html)  for  each 
quantile. 
Source:   Calculations by the authors using ENIGH.  
 
Panel C (2006-10) shows that although changes in hourly wages were practically nil 
across most of the distribution, individuals at the bottom suffered declines in wages. 
Observable  characteristics  do  not  contribute  to  an  explanation  for  the  changes  in 
inequality  in  this  period.  However,  and  in  contrast  with  the  1994-2006  period,  the 
decline in relative returns to low-wage workers accounted for their decline in relative 
wages.  
                                                 
25 We also calculated a similar graph using the decomposition procedure suggested by Chernozhukov, 
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Effects of Returns  11 
In sum, these results suggest that the driving force behind the rise (1989-94), decline 
(1994-2006)  and  slight  increase  (2006-10)  in  wage  inequality  were  the  changes  in 
relative returns. Our next task is to determine which factors explain the behaviour of 
relative  returns.  We  shall  concentrate  on  the  relative  returns  to  skill  because  they 
experienced prominent changes, as shown in Figure 3, Panel A.  
4  Determinants of relative returns: the role of demand, supply  
and institutional factors 
The wage structure (i.e., relative wages by skill, experience, etc.) is affected by demand 
and supply of workers of different skills (and experience) and by institutional factors 
such as the minimum wage and unions. Labour demand by skill, in turn, is primarily 
affected  by  the  characteristics  of  technical  change  and  international  trade.  The 
composition of labour supply is determined, to a large extent, by the characteristics of 
educational upgrading. Figure 5 plots the relative returns and relative supply of workers 
with high school education or more against workers with secondary or less. The left  
y-axis shows the relative returns and the right y-axis the relative supply in logs. The 
increase in relative supply is larger for the period 1996/98-2010 than for the period 1989-
1996/98. The increase in relative supply for the period 1989-98 is approximately 20 per 
cent while for the period 1998-2010 it is approximately 54 per cent. Inequality measured 
as the relative returns for workers with at least high school education, on the other hand, 
increases for the period 1989-94 and it clearly declines for the period 1998-2010.  
Following Bound and Johnson (1992), if increases in supply are larger than increases in 
demand—everything else equal––then we expect relative returns to fall. For the period 
1989-94 we observe both an increase in relative supply and a rise in relative returns for 
workers  with  tertiary  education.  Hence,  either  demand  outpaced  supply  for  skilled 
labour, or institutional factors disfavoured the unskilled, or both. The rapid increase in 
wage inequality that occurred in Mexico between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s has 
been the subject of a fairly large body of research.
26 The main conclusions are that 
institutional factors as well as skill-biased demand explain the observed trend. Further 
details are discussed in the last section of the paper. 
What  about  the  period  1994-2006  when  wage  inequality  declined?  In  Figure  5  we 
observe  that  the  relative  supply  of  skilled  workers  rose  while  the  relative  returns 
declined. This means that either supply outpaced demand, institutional factors moved in 
favour of the unskilled, or both. Figure 6 shows the evolution of the real minimum wage 
and the unionization rate for the period 1988-2010. Panel A includes the monthly index 
of the real minimum wage using as base period December 2010. The real minimum 
wage  fell  by  50  per  cent  between  1988  and  1996.  However,  after  1996  the  real 
minimum wage was fairly stable. Hence, it is unlikely that the minimum wage affected 
the  wage  structure  for  the  period  after  1994.  While  there  is  a  marked  decline  in 
                                                 
26 The following studies analyse the relevance of institutional factors: Bosch and Manacorda (2010), 
Fairris (2003) and Fairris, Popli and Zepeda (2008). The relevance of demand factors and skill biased 
technical change is studied by Airola and Juhn (2005), Bouillon, Legovini and Lustig (2003), Cragg 
and  Epelbaum  (1996),  Esquivel  and  Rodríguez-López  (2003),  Feliciano  (2001),  Hanson  (2003), 
Hanson  and  Harrison  (1999),  López-Acevedo  (2006),  Meza  (2005),  Revenga  (1997),  Robertson 
(2004, 2007) and Verhoogen (2008).   12 
unionization between 1989 and 1996, there was no major change after 1996, although 
there  appears  to  be  a  slight  decline  in  unionization  after  2005  (approximately  1 
percentage point) in the unionization rate after 2005. The minimum wage may affect the 
distribution of wages if the minimum wage is binding because this could result in stable 
real  wages  at  the  bottom  even  if  wages  higher  up  in  the  distribution  experience  a 
decline. Existing evidence suggests that the minimum wage is currently not and has not 
been binding since the mid-1990s. Following Bosch and Manacorda (2010), Figure 7 
shows the wage distributions in 1989 and 2010 for the urban sector once we subtract the 
median wage. 
27 The vertical line is the value of the minimum wage minus the median 
wage. The figure shows that the minimum wage could have been (slightly) binding in 
1989 but not in 2010.  
Figure 5 
 Mexico: Relative returns and relative supply, 1989-2010  
(High school and more vs. secondary or less) 
 
Notes:   Sample restricted to workers 18-65 yrs old. Relative returns are obtained from a regression of 
log  hourly  wages  against  a  dummy  of  high  school  or  college  education,  and  controlling  for 
gender and rural dummies, age and age squared, and 5 geographic dummies (Mexico City, 
Guadalajara, Monterrey, border states, southern states: Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, Yucatán 
and Quintana Roo). Relative supply is equal to the log of the ratio of proportion of workers with 
high school or college over the proportion of workers with secondary or less. 
Source:   Calculations by the authors using ENIGH.  
                                                 
27  Bosch and Manacorda (2010) show that the minimum wage was more binding in 1989 than in current 
years (in their paper they have results until 2001). Only a small proportion of workers earn a wage 
close  to  the  minimum  wage.  In  results  not  shown,  we  calculate  similar  graphs  to  Bosch  and 
Manacorda (2010) and confirm that the minimum wage is not binding anymore.   13 
Figure 6  
Mexico: Real minimum wage and unionization, 1988-2010 
A. Real minimum wage index (December 
2010=100)  B. Unionization rate 
   
Notes and source: 
  Real  minimum  wage  index  is  obtained  from  Comisión  Nacional  de  Salarios  Mínimos 
(www.conasami.gob.mx/)  and  the  unionization  rate  is  obtained  from  two  different  surveys. 
ENIGH  provides  union  information  up  to  2006.  ENOE  (Encuesta  Nacional  de  Ocupación  y 
Empleo) provides union information for the period 2005-10. 
 
Figure 7  
Mexico: Wage distribution with respect to median wage, 1989 and 2010 
 
Notes:   Calculations by the authors using labour force surveys (ENEU and ENOE) for the urban sector 
and  for  full  time  workers  (more  than  25  hours  per  week). Wage  distributions  using  monthly 
earnings. Vertical lines show the log of the minimum wage assuming full time work during the 
month minus the median monthly wage. 
Source:  Calculations by the authors using labour force surveys (ENEU and ENOE). 
In  sum,  it  appears  that  institutional  factors  such  as  the  minimum  wage  and  the 
unionization rate did not play a role in explaining the trends in relative wages/returns 
during 1996-2010. The evolution of relative wages/returns in this period seems to be 
associated with how demand and supply of labour of different skills changed over time. 
For the period 1994-2006, the fall in relative returns appears to have occurred because 
the supply of high skilled workers outpaced demand. Since supply of skilled workers 
continued to increase during 2006-10, the rise in relative returns suggests that either 
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unskilled workers outpaced demand.
28 We now attempt a more rigorous estimation and 
account of demand and supply factors. 
4.1  The effect of demand and supply on relative wages: an application 
of the Bound and Johnson method (1989-2010) 
In order to examine the effect of supply and demand on relative wages, we follow the 
Bound and Johnson (1992) method.
29 Based on the evidence presented in Figures 5 and 
6, and as discussed above, we assume that non -competitive factors (i.e., minimum 
wages and unionization rate) are not important during the 1994-2010 period and ascribe 
the observed trends in relative wages by skill to demand and supply factors alone. 
Assuming a simple CES (constant elasticity of substitution) production function with 
elasticity of substitution, , constant across skills, it is possible to determine the effect 
of supply and demand on relative wages.
30 In particular, it is possible to show that the 
relative wage of workers with at least high school degree ( w
C) in terms of the wage of 
workers with at most secondary education (w
S) can be expressed in terms of its increase 
in demand and supply:  
 
The residual term   contains the effect of skill-biased technical change and other non-
competitive factors. As the unionization rate and the real minimum wage were fairly 
constant during 1994-2006, we assume non-competitive factors are negligible. In order 
to make the simulation simpler, we only simulate changes in supply and assign the full 
residual to demand and skill-biased technical change (which affects demand, of course). 
The supply component is equal to the relative increase of workers with at least high 
school education divided by workers with at most secondary education. Table 1 shows 
the results of the simulation assuming an elasticity of substitution of 1 and 2 which is 
the consensus in the literature (Bound and Johnson 1992; Katz and Autor 1999). 
Consistent with previous research findings, Table 1 suggests that changes in relative 
supply had a small effect on relative wages in the period between 1989 and 1994. Most 
of the changes for that period, then, have to be explained by changes in demand and 
institutional  factors,  as  discussed  above.  The  relative  contribution  of  market  versus 
institutional factors, however, cannot be cleanly disentangled.  
                                                 
28  Using ENOE for the period 2006-2010, we find that the relative returns of college educated workers 
against workers with primary or less declined 0.01 points. However the decline in returns was larger 
for high school educated workers and workers with secondary. Hence, the result of the slowdown in 
returns for college educated workers is robust to the selection of the microdata: ENIGH and ENOE.  
29 We attempted to estimate a model similar to Bound and Johnson (1992) and Manacorda et.al. (2010). 
However, as pointed out by Manacorda et al. (2010), the relevant elasticities of substitution for the 
case  of  Mexico  cannot  be  precisely  estimated.  In  order  to  estimate  the  structural  parameter  , 
Manacorda  et al.  (2010)  use  a  sample  of  workers  from  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia  and 
Mexico; they mention that ‘Mexico does not really contribute to the identification of the regression 
parameters’ (footnote 1, page 314).  
30 See formula (3) in page 377 and formula (A8) in page 390 of Bound and Johnson (1992). 
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Table 1  




-  Supply  =  Rest 
Panel A. σ=1 
      1989-94  0.240  0.111  0.351 
1994-2006  -0.310  0.474  0.164 
2006-10  0.020  0.154  0.174 
Panel B. σ=2 
      1989-94  0.240  0.055  0.295 
1994-2006  -0.310  0.237  -0.073 
2006-10  0.020  0.077  0.097 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on ENIGH, several years. 
For the period of declining relative wages (1994-2006), Table 1 suggests that changes in 
relative supply could account for as much as 47 per cent of changes in relative returns 
(if  is assumed to equal 1). A key issue arises, however, depending on the value we 
assume for the elasticity of substitution. In Panel A ( = 1), relative demand shows a 
steady growth for the period 1994-2010. In Panel B ( = 2), relative demand declined 
for skilled workers (high school and college) during the period 1994-2006 and started to 
rise  again  for  the  period  2006-10.  Taking  the  median  value  of  the  elasticity  of 
substitution (not shown on Table 1), the patterns show a slowdown in demand for the 
period 1994-2006, and then a rise for the period 2006-2010. Hence, the rapid increase in 
relative supply was a key component in explaining the reduction in relative wages, but 
only up to 2006. In recent years, demand patterns appear once again to benefit the high 
skilled  to  a  larger  degree.  Based  on  the  analysis  presented  in  Section  3  and 
Figure 4/Panel C, it would appear that during the 2008/09 recession and its aftermath, 
relative  demand  for  low-wage/low-skilled  workers  declined  the  most.  Employment 
surveys such as ENOE (National Survey of Labour and Employment) actually show that 
open unemployment increased the most for low-wage/low-skilled workers. 
5  Cash transfers and inequality 
Based on the decomposition presented in Section 2 (and Figure 2), another driving force 
behind the reduction of income inequality in Mexico were government transfers. In 
Table 2, one can observe the changes in total disposable income per capita
31 as a result 
of government transfers.  The calculations presented in this table are the result of a 
standard incidence analysis of government transfers.
32 As one can see, the contribution 
                                                 
31 The differences between Gini’s here and those presented in the first paragraphs of this paper are due 
to the fact that there we include information on monetary income only while here we use total income. 
Total  income  includes  monetary  income  plus  auto-consumption  and  imputed  rent  for  owner’s 
occupied housing. 
32 For details, see Lustig et al. (2011a) and López-Calva, Lustig and Scott (2012). Unfortunately, due to 
limitations of the data, it was not feasible to carry this analysis for years prior to 1996. However, 1996 
is the  year before the  flagship Mexican cash transfer (Progresa, later called  Oportunidades)  was 
launched. Hence, the results for 1996 can be used as a baseline.   16 
of government cash transfers to the reduction in inequality and poverty was almost nil in 
1996, it rose in 2000, and it became more significant, especially for poverty reduction, 
in 2010. Most of this change is due to Progresa, the flagship conditional cash transfer 
programme launched in 1997 (which changed its name to Oportunidades in 2002). 
Oportunidades  is  a  conditional  cash  transfer  (federal  government)  programme  that 
targets  rural  and  urban  households  in  Mexico  that  fall  within  the  extreme-poverty 
category.
33  It complements traditional supply -side spending on social services with 
demand-side subsidies. The programme has three components: education, nutrition, and 
health. The education component grants cash transfers based on school attendance, high 
school  completion,  and  the  need  for  school  supplies.  The  nutrition  and  health 
components offer cash and in -kind transfers (nutritional supplements, vaccinations, 
preventative treatments, and so forth), based on regular visits t o a health clinic. The 
average monthly transfer is about US$35 and estimated total transfers are equivalent to, 
on average, 25  per cent  of eligible rural  households’ average monthly income. The 
programme’s size is significant in terms of the number of beneficiaries yet inexpensive 
in terms of cost. By the end of 2010, Progresa/Oportunidades granted benefits to 5.8 
million  families  (about  27  per  cent  of  the  Mexican  population).  Its  budget  in  2010 
equalled  0.48  per  cent  of  GPD  (compared  with  0.02  per  cent  in  1997),  and  it 
commanded  close  to  2.5  per  cent  of  the  programmable  public  expenditure  budget. 




Mexico: The impact of cash and transfers on inequality and poverty, 1996, 2000 and 2010 
    Net market income  Disposable income 
       
1996  Gini  0.522  0.520 
 
% change with respect to net market income  ––  -0.4% 
 
Headcount index ($2.5 PPP)  30.2%  29.9% 
 
% change with respect to net market income  ––  -1.0%         
2000  Gini  0.544  0.539 
 
% change with respect to net market income  ––  -0.9% 
 
Headcount index ($2.5 PPP)  22.1%  21.6% 
 
% change with respect to net market income  ––  -2.3%         
2010  Gini  0.503  0.495 
 
% change with respect to net market income  ––  -1.7% 
 
Headcount index ($2.5 PPP)  13.8%  11% 
 
% change with respect to net market income  ––  -20.1% 
Notes:  Income variables here include monetary and non-monetary components which explains the bulk 
of the difference between the Gini coefficients reported here and on the first paragraph of the 
paper and the Statistical Appendix. The remaining differences are due to rounding errors. 
  Net Market Income is total market income minus direct taxes and contributions to social security.  
  Disposable  income  is  net  market  income  plus  government  transfers  (private  transfers  and 
contributory pensions are included in market income).  
Source:   López-Calva, Lustig and Scott (2012). 
                                                 
33 For  a  detailed  analysis  of  Programa  de  Educación,  Salud,  and  Alimentación  (Progresa)  see,  for 
example, Levy (2006). 
34 See, for example, Bautista et al. (2004), Parker (2005) and Schultz (2000). For more citations see 
Lustig (2011b).   17 
All  in  all,  Progresa/Oportunidades  transformed  the  broadly  neutral  distribution  of 
government  spending  on  food  subsidies  into  a  highly  progressive  one:  the  share 
benefiting the poorest decile increased from 8 to 33 per cent between 1994 and 2000.
35 
Beyond its effects on education, health, and nutrition, Progresa/Oportunidades has had a 
positive impact on poor households’ consumption, thereby helping to reduce poverty 
and inequality in Mexico. In 2004, poverty incidence among programme participants 
(the percentage of the population associated with the program that is below the poverty 
line) fell by 9.7 per cent in rural areas and by 2.6 per cent in urban areas.
36 In terms of 
its impact on the distribution of income, the direct effect of Progresa/Oportunidades 
transfers was equivalent to close t o one-fifth of the decline in the Gini coefficient 
between 1996 and 2006.
37  
6  Concluding remarks: the rise and fall of income inequality and policy regimes 
Previously we identified three episodes in inequality dynamics in Mexico: a period of 
rising inequality (1989-94); a period of declining inequality (1994-2006); and a period 
in which the decline in inequality lost its momentum (2006-10). These periods coincide 
with, roughly, two broad policy regimes. (Table 3) Between 1989 and 1994, the policy 
regime  was  characterized  by  intense  and  widespread  market-oriented  reforms  (with 
trade liberalization and privatizations taking the lead), dismantling of price supports and 
generalized subsidies, and reductions in the minimum wages and unionization rates. 
After 1994, the policy  regime  was  characterized by  a paucity in  structural  reforms, 
strategic integration with the rest of the world (of which the salient example is the North 
American Free Trade Agreement or NAFTA), and the introduction of large-scale (in 
terms of beneficiaries) cash transfer programmes. Minimum wages became non-binding 
and the unionization rate remained low. What, if any, might be the connection between 
the policy regimes and inequality outcomes? 
Our  analysis  indicates  that  the  rise  in  overall  inequality  between  1989  and  1994  is 
accounted for, to a large extent, by the rise in labour income inequality. The rise in 
labour income inequality, in turn, is associated with the increase in relative returns for 
skilled workers (where skilled workers are those who hold a high school degree or 
more). The increase in the skilled-unskilled wage gap coincided with the unilateral trade 
liberalization that started in the mid-1980s (Table 3). In that sense, the evolution of 
Mexico’s  wage  inequality  was  unexpected;  Mexico  had  an  abundance  of  relatively 
unskilled labour (at  least  from  the perspective  of its  main trade partner, the United 
States), and standard theories of trade predicted exactly the opposite pattern (that is, a 
reduction in the skilled-unskilled wage ratio).
38  
 
                                                 
35 See Scott (2009). 
36 Cortés, Solís and Banegas (2006).  
37 Scott (2009). The impact on the Gini coefficient takes account of only the direct effect. The effects on 
inequality of changes in behavior or of higher human capital among the poor are not contemplated in 
this calculation.  
38  For a discussion of trade liberalization and its implications see, for example, Lustig (1998).   18 
Table 3 
Mexico: Policy regimes, 1989-2010 
  1989-94  1994-2010 
     
Macro 
 
– Aftermath of 1980s debt crisis  
– Contractionary fiscal and monetary 
policies; 
– Quasi-fixed exchange  
– Very low growth 
– Inflation under control starting in 
1989 
 
– 1995 peso crisis and recovery 
– Fiscal discipline (balanced budget 
law passed in 2006) 
– Inflation-targeting by central bank 
since 1999  
– Flexible exchange rate regime 
– Low growth (GDP/capita growth of 
around 1% annually) with some 
inflation in the second half of 
1990s; low inflation since around 
2000 
–  Output contracted sharply in 
2008/09 due to great recession in 
US 
Labour  – Minimum wages and unionization 
rates declined markedly 
– Minimum wages stable and not 
binding. Unionization rates stable 
with a slight decline since 2005 
Openness  – Unilateral trade liberalization since 
1985. Mexico joins GATT in 1986.  
– Foreign direct investment liberalized 
– NAFTA  comes into effect in 1994. 




– Large scale privatizations (banks 
and telecommunications)  
– Deregulation 
–  Dismantling of price support (and 
other) schemes in agriculture and 
elimination of general production 
and consumption subsidies 
– Social security reforms 
 
Social Policy   – Very small scale targeted subsidies 
to tortilla 
– Flagship anti-poverty program 
Programa Nacional de Solidaridad 
focused on expanding rural 
infrastructures (no targeted cash 
transfer 
– Targeted Cash Transfer Programs: 
Procampo in 1995 and Progresa in 
1997.Progressa changes name to 
Oportunidades in 2002 and is 
expanded to urban areas and 
includes children in high school.  
– Noncontributory pensions in rural 
areas in 2007 (Seventy or more) 
Inequality  Increased  – Declined especially between 1998 
and 2004; between 2006 and 
2010, decline loses momentum 
and wage inequality slightly rises 
Notes:  a)  Progresa/Oportunidades: Launched in 1997. Provides direct monetary and in kind transfers 
conditional  on  school  attendance  and  health  visits.  Targeted  geographically  and  at  the 
household level through a proxy-means test calibrated to match the official poverty measure in 
Mexico.  Scholarships  cover  the  last  three  years  of  basic  education  and  high school,  with 
increasing  values  for  higher  levels,  designed  to  approximate  labour  opportunity  costs. 
Conditional on school inscription and attendance. Beneficiary households also receive a per 
household transfer conditional of attending health services, as well as nutritional supplements 
targeted  at  infants  and  pregnant  women.  By  the  end  of  2010,  Progresa  /Oportunidades 
granted benefits to 5.8 million families (about 27% of the Mexican population). 
  b)  Procampo:  Direct  monetary  transfer  per  hectare,  originally  set  at  close  to  US$100  per 
hectare to all beneficiaries identified in the original 1993 survey on the basis of cultivation of 
nine basic crops. Conditional on cultivation of the land, but after 1995 not conditional on 
particular crops. Administrative data: 2.39 million beneficiaries in 2008.  
  c)   Seventy or more: Non-contributory pension. All the population of 70 years and older living in 
localities of 30,000 or less are eligible for this universal rural non-contributory basic pension 
of 500 pesos (US$37) per month. Administrative data: 1.031 million beneficiaries in 2008. 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on Lustig (2010). 
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Why  did  trends  in  relative  wages  during  1989  and  1994  contradict  expectations 
(stemming from standard trade theory)? First, this period also coincided with labour 
market policies/institutional changes that disfavoured the low-skilled: a reduction in real 
minimum  wages  and  in  the  unionization  rate  (Table  3  and  Figure  6).  Bosch  and 
Manacorda (2010) find evidence that these institutional factors were quite decisive in 
causing wage inequality to rise. In addition, there is evidence that the direct and indirect 
impact  of  the  opening  up  of  the  economy  (trade  liberalization  and  foreign  direct 
investment liberalization) contributed to the rise in the wage gap by skill. The direct 
effect occurred because—contrary to expectations-- some labour-intensive sectors (such 
as  textiles  and  garments)  were  relatively  more  protected  under  import-substitution 
industrialization and were hurt by trade liberalization.
39 The indirect effect manifested 
itself through skill-biased technical change (though, admittedly, it is hard to disentangle 
which part of the latter is induced by openness or occurs independently). 
Is there a connection between the policies pursued after 1994 and the decline in overall 
inequality? Again, the results of the decomposition exercise presented in  Section 2 and 
in Esquivel, Lustig and Scott suggest that one of the most important inequality-reducing 
forces between 1994 and 2006 has been the evolution of labour income inequality. Note 
that labour income is basically the result of multiplying hours worked by hourly wages 
(here defined as including remunerations to the self -employed). It turns out that hours 
worked did not change much from 1994 to 2006,
40 so the change in  labour income 
inequality must have been caused by changes in hourly wage inequality.  Some authors 
have  linked  the  reduction  in  wage  inequality  to  NAFTA.  Robertson  (2007),  for 
example, suggests that Mexico’s manufacturing workers are now complements, rather 
than  substitutes,  to  US  workers.  He  also  posits  that  there  has  been  an  important 
expansion of assembly-line activities in Mexico (maquiladoras), which has increased 
demand  for  less-skilled  workers
.41  Campos  (2008)  emphasizes  the  supply-side 
explanations based on changes in the composition of the labour force.  
Between 1989 and 1994, most of the changes in the wage distribution occurred in the 
upper tail of the distribution (workers with high wages and high levels of education and 
experience). As was seen in Figure 4, Panel A, the increase in wage inequality in those 
years was not caused by a (relative) decline in the wages of the low-skilled or low-
experienced workers; rather it was the result of a higher rise in the wages of the high-
                                                 
39  See, for example, Hanson and Harrison (1999) and Revenga (1997). 
40 Actually,  between  1994  and  2006,  weekly  hours  in  all  jobs  fell  slightly  and  the  decline  was 
concentrated in low education (poorer) workers which would be an inequality-increasing change. This 
means that the inequality-reducing changes in the distribution of hourly earnings must have been large 
enough to compensate for the inequality-increasing effect of the changes in the distribution of hours 
worked.  Data  on  weekly  hours  and  hourly  wages  are  available  at:  www.depeco.econo 
.unlp.edu.ar/sedlac/. 
41 Robertson (2007) notices that the pattern of wage inequality in Mexico is puzzling because no single 
theory could explain the evolution of wage inequality before and after NAFTA. There are, however, 
some tentative theoretical explanations for the pattern. For example, Atolia (2007) has suggested that, 
under certain circumstances, even if the standard prediction from a Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson model 
works  as  predicted  in  the  long-run,  there  may  be  some  short-run  (or  transitory)  effects  of  trade 
liberalization that may lead to a different outcome from those of the long-run. The difference between 
short-run  and  long-run  effects  on  inequality  result  from  two  factors:  first,  an  asymmetry  in  the 
contraction and expansion of some sectors, and second, because of the capital-skill complementarity 
in production.   20 
skilled or high-experienced workers. In contrast, between 1994 and 2006 the reduction 
in  wage  inequality  was  caused  by  the  changes  in  the  lower  tail  of  the  income 
distribution. Average wages for workers with lower levels of education and/or fewer 
years  of  experience  increased  (Figure  4,  Panel  B),  even  though  average  real  and 
legislated minimum wages were practically flat over this period (Figure 6). Average 
wages  for  higher-paid  workers  (high-skilled  and/or  high-experienced  workers),  in 
contrast, declined between 1994 and 2006 (Figure 4, Panel B). 
For the post-NAFTA period (after 1994), then, there are at  least  two (not mutually 
exclusive) possible explanations: an increase in the relative supply of skilled workers 
and an increase in the demand for low-skilled labour resulting from an expansion in 
assembly-line activities (maquiladoras) in Mexico’s manufacturing sector.
.42 Based on 
our analysis presented in Section 4 (Table 1), the reduction in relative returns of the 
high-skilled workers seems to be driven, primarily, by the rise in their relative supply.  
The increase in the relative supply of workers with high levels of skills reflects the 
significant educational upgrading of the labour force that occurred during this period. 
(Figure 5) Part of this upgrading should be the consequence of the expansionary policies 
in terms of access to education (see Esquivel, Lustig and Scott). However, part might 
also be a consequence of more individuals deciding to invest in a tertiary degree in 
response to the rising returns to skill experienced between 1989 and 1994 (and, actually 
since 1984). This would suggest that Mexico experienced a Tinbergean process in the 
sense  that  skill-biased  demand  (due  to  trade  liberalization  and  technical  change) 
contributed  (along  with  institutional  factors)  to  a  significant  increase  in  the  skill 
premium. This, in turn, could have induced individuals to invest more in their own 
education (completing high school and tertiary degrees). The subsequent increase in the 
relative  supply  of  more  educated  workers  (high  school  and  more)  caused  the  skill 
premium (and wage inequality) to decline. 
In sum, the results reveal the following. Relative supply only marginally affected the 
wage structure during the period 1989-94. Therefore, relative demand and institutional 
factors are responsible for the increase in inequality. On the other hand, after 1994 
institutional factors have remained largely unchanged; in particular, the minimum wage 
became non-binding during the period. At the same time, relative supply  of skilled 
labour (completed high school or more) increased by more than 50 per cent and relative 
demand slowed down which resulted in lower inequality. The period 2006-2010 has 
seen a small increase in inequality. This is mainly due to a decrease in wages at the 
bottom and not to an increase of wages at the top. Does this point to a reversal in the 
wage  inequality  dynamics  in  Mexico?  At  this  point,  it  is  too  soon  to  be  able  to 
disentangle  the  permanent  versus  the  temporal  effects  of  the  recent  macroeconomic 
crisis caused by the great recession in the United States. 
Finally, overall inequality has declined because non-labour income inequality declined 
too. Our analysis and that presented in Esquivel, Lustig and Scott suggest that a change 
in social policy from general subsidies to cash transfers targeted to the poor contributed 
to the decline in inequality especially since 2000, when the number of beneficiaries was 
increased. 
                                                 
42 Campos (2008); Robertson (2007).   21 
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Methodological appendix 
Static decomposition of the Gini coefficient: Lerman and Yitzhaki method 
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) showed that the Gini coefficient for total income inequality 
(G) with K income sources can be expressed as 
 
where Sk is the share of source k in total income, Gk is the Gini coefficient of the income 
source k, and Rk is the Gini correlation between the income source k and total income. 
This decomposition of the Gini coefficient has a neat and clear-cut interpretation since it 
shows that the contribution of income source k to inequality depends on the interaction 
of three elements: (i) how important the income source on total income is (Sk), b) how 
unequally  distributed  the  income  source  is  (Gk),  and  c)  how  correlated  the  income 
source and the distribution of total income are (Rk).  
Therefore, an income source that represents a relatively large share of total income 
could have a large effect on inequality as long as it is unequally distributed (i.e. if it has 
a relatively high Gk). However, if Gk is low, this factor will dwarf the contribution of 
that income source. On the other hand, if an income source is very unequally distributed 
but it is not highly correlated with total income (as in the case of well-targeted anti-
poverty transfer programmes), then the contribution of such source could in fact become 
negative. 
Later on, Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986) showed that with this type of decomposition 
one could estimate the effect of a small percentage change (yk) in a given income source 
on total inequality (holding all other income sources constant) through the following 
expression: 
  
   
               
or, alternatively, 
  
     
 
  
      
 
     
                   
This expression means that the per cent change in inequality resulting from a marginal 
percentage change in income source k is equal to the initial share of income source k on 
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